readings

•Data: Growth rate of GDP compared to the same quarter of previous year, seasonally adjusted

•Source: http://stats.oecd.org

•Why since 1998? The banking crisis in the Czech Republic was almost over. This range allows for capturing business cycles. Therefore, past 48 quarters and 27 countries and clubs were chosen depending on the availability of data

•Benefit? The analysis can help to understand the relations between particular countries and their dependence

•Drawback? Correlation does not say anything about causality. Pure description, no econometrics. Deeper understanding needed

•Results: The development of all analysed countries show a similar pattern, with Slovakia exhibiting exceptional behaviour

•Slovakia is seen as by far the most volatile followed by Finland, Mexico, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, Norway, Switzerland, and France are the least volatile countries in the set

•From 1999 until 2009 there was not a single period of negative quarterly GDP growth in Czech Republic

•Czech Republic is much more correlated with Eurozone than Slovakia

•

READINGS:

------------------------------

Edvard Benes: Pameti I - Mnichovske dny (nezapomen, ze Benes byl filosof, uz v roce 1937 vysla kniha Benes Filosof a statnik, kterou jsem nakonec nekoupil, nebot vypadala, nebot Benesuv zivotni pribeh je bez Mnichova a bez Vitezneho unora nekompletni)

materialismus: p.82 Hajim stanovisko, ze se cinitele mravni, nabozensti, narodni a vubec jevy psychologicke a duchovni z hlediska filosofickeho a metafyzickeho nedaji na cinitele materialni, tj. hospodarske ani prevesti, ani jimi beze zbytku vyloziti. Nikdy jsem se natajil, ze filosoficky a metafysicky prijimam spiritualistickou koncepci zivotniho a svetovaeho deni a nikliv koncepci materialistickou.

hodnoty str. 85: Jsou v zivote lidi a narodu nektere hodnoty, ktere se neopousteji nikdy, nikdy

role intuice, str.88: Ale i veda sama, tozum a modenierni racionalismus a intelektualismus prochazel brzy krizi (v 19.stoleti). Teorie poznani dosla presvedceni , ze ani rozum (intelekt) sam neni jediny pramenem poznani, cit a instinkt , intuice, hraji take svoji vyznacnou roli v poznavani

Podobne pise (v trohuc jine souvisoloti i material UK: Perspektivy vysokeho skolstvi:

http://iforum.cuni.cz/IFORUM-7283-version1-PerspektivyUKobecnavychodiska.pdf

homo oeconomicus str3: nelze redukovat spolecnost na jeji ekonomicke funkce, nelze cloveka redukovat na pracovni silu a na spotrebiltele

Fifty faces that shaped the decade

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/32e550e8-efd4-11de-833d-00144feab49a.html

asi bych vybral jinak, ale dobre videt

readings

http://respekt.ihned.cz/z-noveho-cisla/c1-39222880-rozhovor-s-vaclavem-havlem
Vaclav Havel: "S odstupem času mi víc než konkrétní kroky vadí celkový pohled na svět, marxistický pohled na svět. I když se všichni tváří jako antikomunisté, vycházejí z toho, že důležitá a rozhodující je materiální základna a z ní jako ozdoba či ornament vychází jakási nadstavba. Že bytí určuje vědomí, jak učil Marx, který lehce přehlédl, že občas také vědomí určuje bytí. Vadí mi ten ohromný důraz na ekonomiku a projekce ekonomické interpretace jevů a ekonomického myšlení do všech oblastí života.
Mám ale dojem, že býti politikem je více než jenom ekonomem."


Komentar k clankum:
obecne:
k poslednimu tematu se hodi Vernon Smith, Nobelista 2002 (trosinku jsem ho cetl, ale je to desny Cato)
http://www.libinst.cz/clanky.php?id=354&highlight=vernon%20smith
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj19n2/cj19n2-1.pdf

Smith sve manzelce natvrdo rika, ze ji vyuziva, nebot to je jediny rozumny duvod, proc s ni je. "Proc bych s tebou jinak byl, kdybys mi neprinasela uzitek a nemohl te vyuzivat?"

"Ve své ekonomické laboratoři na arizonské univerzitě v Tusconu zkoumal Vernon Smith poskytování veřejných statků, modely privatizace, kapitálové trhy, deregulace i instituce, které ještě v praxi nevznikly nebo je bylo obtížné měřit. Jednoduše řečeno, ze svých studentů se snažil vypreparovat pověstného homo oeconomicus. A uspěl."

Samozrejme ma mnoho kritiku

K symbolum:
Inspiration for the € symbol itself came from the Greek epsilon (Є) – a reference to the cradle of European civilisation – and the first letter of the word Europe, crossed by two parallel lines to ‘certify’ the stability of the euro.

The sign $ is attested in business correspondence between the British, Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans in the 1770s, as referring to the Spanish-Mexican peso,^[1][2] known as "Spanish dollar" or "pieces of eight" in British North America where it was adopted as U.S. currency in 1785, together with the term "dollar" and the $ sign.

The origin of the "$" sign has been variously accounted for. Perhaps the most widely accepted explanation is that it is the result of the evolution of the Spanish and Mexican scribal abbreviation "p^s" for pesos. This theory, derived from a study of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century manuscripts, explains that the s gradually came to be written over the p developing a close equivalent to the "$" mark." ale nejasne dle WIKI:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar/Peso_sign

Yen to ma take pro "jistotu"
Das Y ist der Anfangsbuchstabe des Wortes Yen. Die beiden Querstriche symbolisieren wirtschaftliche Sicherheit.
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C2%A5

a jeste moneyless society
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_credit

Perhaps most famously, Captain Jean-Luc Picard states in the film Star Trek: First Contact that

"The economics of the future is somewhat different. You see, money doesn't exist in the 24th century. The acquisition of wealth is no longer the driving force in our lives. We work to better ourselves and the rest of humanity."

It appears therefore that money ceased to be used within the Federation at some point prior to the 24th century (TNG). The concept of a moneyless society, in which each person contributes freely and willingly to the good of the whole, is not unique to Star Trek, and is a theme developed in Utopian theory and writings - such as William Morris' News From Nowhere, published in 1890 in the United Kingdom. The economics of the Federation may be compared closely with Utopian philosophy and literature.

V Cesku si vzpominam na utopicky komunisticky film s Milosem Kopeckym, taky asi 23.stoleti

readings

https://www.mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae9_3_1.pdf Realism and abstraction in economics: Aristotle and Mises versus Friedman
RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer
As an empiricist, Friedman takes a theory to explain a phenomenon if it enables us to predict
the phenomenon’s occurrence; whereas for Austrians, to explain economic
phenomena is, in Ludwig Lachmann’s phrase, “to make the world
around us intelligible in terms of human action and the pursuit of plans”
(Lachmann 1977, pp. 261–62).Lachmann, Ludwig M. 1977. “Sir John Hicks as a Neo-Austrian.” In Capital, Expectations,
and the Market Process. Walter E. Grinder, ed. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and
McMeel.

RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer
Aristotle’s theory of abstraction may be seen as a response to the following
worry. It can easily seem that abstract concepts do not strictly apply to reality.

Aristotle. . 1951. Physica. W.D. Ross, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
We must consider how the mathematician differs from the physicist; for
physical bodies have surfaces and volumes, lengths and points, all of
which fall within the mathematician’s purview. . . . Now the mathematician
too is concerned with such things, but not qua boundaries of physical
bodies. . . . For they are separable in thought from motion, though from
this separation no distinction or falsity arises. (Physics 193b22–36)
prepsat neco podobne na ekonomii

Abstraction may occur in two ways. First . . . we may understand that one
thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate from it. Secondly
. . . we understand one thing without considering another. Thus, for the
intellect to abstract one from another things which are not really abstract
from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood.
But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things
which are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood.
. . . If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing
otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word otherwise refers to the thing
understood. . . . Hence, the intellect would be false if it abstracted the
species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to think that the species
did not exist in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if otherwise be taken
as referring to the one who understands. (Summa Theologiæ I. 85. 1 ad 1;
Aquinas 1999, p. 157)


RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer
In recent years, this Aristotelean approach to abstraction has been revived
by Ayn Rand. On the issue of universals Abélard was a nominalist and
Aquinas a realist, while Rand attempted to transcend the nominalist/realist
dichotomy altogether; all three thinkers, however, stand in the Aristotelean tradition,
and all three appealed to nonprecisive abstraction to explain how concepts
apply to reality. Rand does not employ the Scholastic terminology, but
her approach follows that of her Aristotelean predecessors.

Rand, Ayn. 1990. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition.
Harry Binswanger and Leonard Peikoff, eds. New York: Penguin.
If a child considers a match, a pencil and a stick, he observes that length is
the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ. . . . In
order to form the concept “length,” the child’s mind retains the attribute and
omits its particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were
identified in words, it would consist of the following: “Length must exist in
some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as ‘length’ that
attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to
a unit of length, without specifying the quantity. . . . Bear firmly in mind
that the term “measurements omitted” does not mean, in this context, that
measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means that measurements
exist, but are not specified. (Rand 1990, pp. 11–12)

The basic principle of concept-formation (which states that the omitted
measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity)
is the equivalent of the basic principle of algebra, which states that algebraic
symbols must be given some numerical value, but may be given any
value. . . . In the equation 2a = a + a, any number may be substituted for
the symbol “a” without affecting the truth of the equation. . . . Let those
who attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find
“manness” in men, try to invalidate algebra by declaring that they cannot
find “a-ness” in 5 or in 5,000,000. ((Rand 1990,p. 18)

RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer, p.9
Friedman, as we’ve seen, thinks that a worthwhile economic theory
“must be descriptively false in its assumptions,” since it “takes account of, and
accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances” but instead
“abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and
detailed circumstances.” Friedman is of course quite right that an economic
theory needs to leave aside a mass of complex details; but so long as it leaves
them aside by failing to specify them, rather than by specifying their absence,
it does not need to be descriptively false.
RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer, p.10
But realism does not
demand that all these extraneous traits be specified; it merely demands that
their nonexistence not be specified either. Those who criticize neoclassical
models for their lack of realism are not seeking a precisive abstraction that
more closely approximates reality; rather, they are seeking an abstraction that
is not precisive at all. The right question to ask is not “How closely should our
theories approximate reality in order to yield useful predictions?” but rather
“How much specificity should our theories incorporate in order to yield useful
explanations?”

Comte, Charles. 1826. Traité de Législation; ou Exposition des Lois Générales Suivant
Lesquelles les Peuples Prospèrent, Dépérissent ou Restent Stationnaires. Paris:
Sautelet.
One must not confuse an incomplete analysis with a false or unfaithful
analysis. The former indicates only part of the characteristics of the object
described; but everything that it does describe is correct, and it refrains
from asserting that there exist no other characteristics than those which it
has outlined. The latter describes things otherwise than they are, or presents,
as complete, descriptions that are not so. (Comte 1826, vol. 1, pp.
79–80)

BUT
Milton Friedman
"The Methodology of Positive Economics" In Essays In Positive Economics
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 25
Euclidean geometry is an abstract model, logically complete and consistent.
Its entities are precisely defined—a line is not a geometrical figure
“much” longer than it is wide and deep; it is a figure whose width and
depth are zero. It is also obviously “unrealistic.” There are no such things
in “reality” as Euclidean points or lines or surfaces. (Friedman 1953, p. 25)

Bastiat, Frédéric. 1964. Economic Harmonies. W. Hayden Boyers, trans. Irvington-on-Hudson,
N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Foundation.
Religious sentiment, paternal and maternal affection, filial devotion, love,
friendship, patriotism, charity, politeness—these belong to the moral
realm, which embraces all the appealing regions of human sympathy, leaving
for the sister science of political economy only the cold domain of selfinterest.
. . . What does it deal with? With transactions carried on between
people who do not know each other, who owe each other nothing beyond
simple justice, who are defending and seeking to advance their own selfinterest.
It deals with claims that are restricted and limited by other claims,
where self-sacrifice and unselfish dedication have no place. . . . Thus,
political economy regards man from one side only, and our first concern
must be to study him from this point of view. (Bastiat 1964, pp. 25–26)

RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer, p.14
The classicals were not really such fools as to suppose that “self-interested”
and “altruistic” motives can be cleanly separated into different compartments
of life; but they did regard the hypothesis of pure self-interest as a good
enough predictor of people’s behavior in the business world. In short, their
position was rather like Friedman’s. They differed from Friedman, of course,
in wanting their theories to be at least close approximations to reality, whereas
for Friedman it is only a theory’s predictions, not the theory itself, that must
be squared with reality; but for the classicals no less than for Friedman the
principles of economics are precisive abstractions and thus are not strictly
applicable to the real world.


Mises, 1978. Notes and Recollections. Hans Sennholz, trans. South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian
Press.
The task of economics, as many epigones of the classical economists practised
it, was to deal not with events as they really happened, but only with
forces that contributed in some not clearly defined manner to the emergence
of what really happened. Economics did not actually aim at explaining
the formation of market prices, but at the description of something
that together with other factors played a certain, not clearly described role
in the process. (Mises 1978, p. 75)

RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer, p.15
On Mises’s view, by contrast, economics “deals with the real actions of real
men. Its theorems refer neither to ideal nor to perfect men, neither to the
phantom of a fabulous economic man (homo oeconomicus) nor to the statistical
notion of an average man (homme moyen)” (Mises . 1966. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. 3rd rev. ed. Chicago: Contemporary Books., p. 651). As for
Menger, Mises suggests that he was “too much under the sway of John Stuart
Mill’s empiricism to carry his own point of view to its full logical consequences”
(Mises. 1984. The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig
von Mises Institute., pp. 27–28).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical
Investigations. 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row.
If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement
and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion,
assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive
forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the
confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought. When
we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist which seems to
enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions,
which are clear-cut and transparent. . . . We see that we can build
up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding
new forms. (Wittgenstein 1980, p. 17)


TOTO KRITIZOVAT:
Milton Friedman
"The Methodology of Positive Economics"
In Essays In Positive Economics
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 3-16, 30-43.
A hypothesis is important if it “explains” much by little, that is, if it
abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and
detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and
permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone. To be important,
therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it
takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances,
since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena
to be explained. . . . Truly important and significant hypotheses
will be found to have “assumptions” that are wildly inaccurate descriptive
representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory,
the more unrealistic the assumptions. (Friedman 1953, pp. 14–15)

RT Long - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2006 - Springer, p.21
Whatever else they may disagree on,
Friedman and Mises agree that an a priori ethics is impossible. Those who
defend the possibility of a rationally justifiable ethics, Mises contends, are
essentially claiming that moral knowledge is “imparted to man by an inner
voice, i.e., by intuition,” and fail to recognize that “with regard to the interpretation
of the inner voice . . . no method of peacefully settling . . . disagreements
can be found” (Mises 1985, p. 53). The parallel between Mises’s criticism
of a priori ethics and Friedman’s criticism of Mises’s own a priori
economics is striking—and should lead us to suspect that Mises has here fallen
into Friedman’s own confusion between the private character of an “inner
voice” and the public character of logic.





toto jsme kdysi hledali
Tomáš SEDLÁČEK, ekonom /ukázka/ -------------------- V Český republice je ten problém, že se nám prostě daří a daří se nám i bez reforem. Takže když se analytici snaží najít slabinu naší ekonomiky, tak to v makročíslech nenaleznou, ale největší slabina naší ekonomiky je paradoxně v její síle. V momentě, kdy ta ekonomika je silná a funguje, lidem se daří jakžtakž dobře, tak přesvědčujte národ, že je s výhledem dvaceti, třiceti let třeba si utáhnout opasky. Lidé tuší, že není všechno v pořádku, ale nevidí důvod k radikálním reformám. Těch radikálních reforem se bojí a je do jistý míry chybou politiků, že nebyli schopni komunikovat, že ty reformy se dělají de facto nikoliv pro politiku nebo proto, že to po nás chce měnový, Mezinárodní měnový fond, ale že ty reformy de facto jsou pro lidi a je to stejně tak, jako když si děláte dietu. Tu děláte sám pro sebe. Politik je od toho, aby lidi přesvědčil, že je byt třeba vymalovat, to znamená, je třeba se vystěhovat, je třeba dát do toho práce, je třeba si neužívat pohodlí svého vlastního domova po několik dnů, ale, když se vrátíme, tak ten byt bude vymalovaný.
http://www.cerge.cuni.cz/news/in_the_media/data/Lizal%20CRo6%2026-12-2006.pdf

readings

readings:
Aranzadi 2006, Liberalism vs. Liberalism: Why are moral norms accepted? Becker's answer is that they are accepted because the monetary compensation exceeds the loss of utility.
BUT
Rothbard (1998, p.208-15):
- counterexample with revolution (rich will prefer to give their property to the poor because they will be compensated for it by not being killed by the poor)

richard thaler, 2000. From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 14, Number 1, Winter:
- My prediction is that the trend [complete rationality and mathematisation of behavior] will be reversed in favour of an approach in which the degree of rationality bestowed to the agents depends on the context being studied.
- (p.139) Homo Economicus will become more emotional, by which I mean that economists will devote more attention to the study of emotions
- (p.140) my prediction is that homo economicus will evolve into Homo Sapiens
- (p.140)One reason economics did not start out this way is that behavioural models are harder than tradtitional models. Building models of rationalm unemotional agents is easier that building models if quasi-rational emotional humans.
- (p.140) As economists become more sophistocated , their ability to incorporate the findings of other disciplines such as psyhchology improves
Economics will have to incorporate more works by other social sciences (such as Kahneman, Tversky cognitive psychology)

http://hn.ihned.cz/c1-39047570-prokleta-nula

a pro pochopeni Klause (ale abyste si neukroutili hlavu, az to budete cist)
http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=IBynAOP4ccgg

readings

Bylo další velkou chybou, že jsme po listopadu uvěřili v normotvornou roli trhu. V důsledku toho jsme zanedbali vytváření institucionálních podmínek pro volný trh, zanedbali jsme vytváření státu práva a přivodili si tak řadu zbytečných zklamání a frustrací. Způsobili jsme zbytečný odpor vůči trhu a opětný příklon k falešným socialistickým floskulím.
http://blog.aktualne.centrum.cz/blogy/mirek-topolanek.php?itemid=8106.

http://www.vse.cz/polek/abstrakt.php3?IDcl=684
http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/8977
Easterlin (1974) vysledoval následující empirické vztahy mezi důchodem a štěstím:
1. V rámci jednoho státu jsou lidé s vyšším příjmem v průměru šťastnější, než lidé
chudší. Toto zjištění je zcela v souladu s předpoklady ekonomie.
2. V mezinárodním srovnání je korelace mezi výší příjmu a reportovanou mírou štěstí
rovněž signifikantní, nicméně pouze do určité míry. Od jisté úrovně hrubého
domácího produktu4 se tato závislost ztrácí a mezi bohatými státy již větší výkon
ekonomiky na šťastnější populaci neukazuje.
3. Pozorování vývoje subjektivně pociťovaného štěstí v čase pak ukazuje výrazný
rozchod s neoklasickou ekonomickou teorií – Easterlin dokazuje, že růst důchodu
v čase nemá na štěstí člověka vliv. Přestože po druhé světové válce ve všech
vyspělých zemích došlo k několikanásobnému růstu produktu na obyvatele,
spokojenost obyvatelstva stagnovala.
Easterlinova pozorování postavila ekonomy před problém zásadního charakteru. Platnost
základní premisy beroucí užitek jako rostoucí funkci důchodu, a s tím platnost ekonomické
teorie vycházející z neoklasické syntézy, byla ohrožena.
Dle Aristotela existuje všeobecný konsenzus, že takový cíl musí nést následující znaky - musí
být (Nussbaum 2005, s. 175):
1. konečným cílem – tedy zahrnovat vše, co má nějakou vnitřní hodnotu
2. nezávislý – to znamená, že neexistuje nic, co by svým přidáním zvýšilo jeho hodnotu
3. aktivní – Aristoteles zde poukazuje na v jeho době všeobecně uznávaný fakt, že nelze
dosáhnout štěstí nečinností - k pravému štěstí vede pouze život aktivní
4. všeobecně dostupný – nelze tedy nikoho předem vyloučit z dosažení štěstí
5. stabilní – jako štěstí neobstojí nic, co může být odstraněno pouhým řízením náhody.
Mezi řeckými klasiky se ustálil název takového štěstí jako eudaimonia – nejvyšší,
nejvznešenější a nejpříjemnější věc, které může člověk dosáhnout. Štěstí jako eudaimonia
proto nikdy není nástrojem pro dosažení něčeho dalšího. Naopak všechny ostatní dobré věci,
včetně bohatsví, jsou pouze nástroji k dosažení štěstí.
Eudaimonii rozlišuje Aristoteles striktně od hedonismu. Zatímco požitek je momentální
euforií, smyslový vjemem, eudaimonia, jak píše Martha Nussbaum (2005, s. 171), je chápána
jako „aktivní, vzkvétající, lidský život nepostrádající nic, co by ho učinilo úplnějším,
bohatším nebo lepším.“12
Pro nás zásadním pozorováním je Aristotelovo vysvětlení JAK eudaimonie dosáhnout. Dle
Aristotela se to děje nepřímo, praktikováním tzv. „ctnostných aktivit ducha“. Nusbaum (1986)
identifikuje tyto základní ctnosti – jsou jimi nezištná kultivace přátelství a lásky a aktivní
činnost pro dobro společenství. Podstatné je, že tyto ctnosti musí být sledovány upřímně –
pokud by byly jen prostředkem k dosažení něčeho jiného, nebyly by totiž ctnostmi. Skrze
nepokryté sledování těchto ctností pak člověk nepřímo dosahuje konečného cíle - eudaimonie.
Fakt, že svého konečného cíle dosahuje člověk nepřímo, aktivitou zaměřenou na ostatní,
upřímným praktikováním ctností čistě pro jejich vnitřní hodnotu, ukazuje na logický rozpor
v konceptu eudaimonie. Logický ale pouze do té míry, dokud se pohybujeme ve sféře
metodologického individualismu.