readings

http://www.cnb.cz/m2export/sites/www.cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/pro_media/konference_projevy/vystoupeni_projevy/download/singer_20091218_ing.pdf

p.16 Porovnani financni pomoci v EU 27 (CR 0% HDP)

nejvyssi pomer deposit k uverum (p.20)

10y gov bond (p.30) roste a poroste

http://ekonomika.ihned.cz/c1-39616610-dedictvi-krize-obrovske-statni-dluhy

pekne grafy

http://www.kcckp.net/en/great/works.php?2

http://www.kcckp.net/en/book/download.php?3+3001

Neco o severokorejske filosofii Juche

In understanding the Juche philosophy, it is also necessary to

grasp correctly the new man-centred outlook on the world.

The Juche philosophy established the outlook on the world by

regarding man as the main factor and clarified the viewpoint and

attitude towards the world by focussing on man.

It has already been established by materialistic dialectic that the

world consists of material, not consciousness or ideas, and that it

moves, changes and develops in accordance with its own laws, not

by any supernatural force. It is an undeniable fact that the world is, in

essence, a material entity, a material integrity, and that it moves,

changes and develops in accordance with its inherent laws. The

Juche philosophy answered a new question—who is the master of the

world and what is the motive force for its transformation. It

elucidated a new idea of the world that nature and society are

dominated and transformed by man, and thus fulfilled brilliantly the

philosophical task of our time when the popular masses are masters

of their own destiny and history

he Juche philosophy made it clear for the first time that

independence, creativity and consciousness are the essential features

of man, the social being. Thus it gave a perfect conception of man

and a correct philosophical answer to his position and role as master

who dominates and transforms nature and society

>>tak a uz nemusime zkoumat roli a vyznam cloveka, protoze Kim Cong Il to vsechno vysvetluje..

BTW: zda se, ze nektere libertarianske teorie o tom, ze ultimatnim cilem veckereho byti je clovek a jeho spotreba, mi tuto severokorejsou filosofii pripominaji

http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=19559465/cl=15/nw=1/rpsv/factbook2009/07/01/01/07-01-01-g1.htm

OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
	Science and technology
		Research and development (R&D)
			Expenditure on R&D
			Gross domestic expenditure on R&D As a percentage of GDP below OECD average but surprisingly on par with Norway -------------------------------- Critical analysis of “The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour” by G. Becker By Martin Pospisil Professor Gary Becker in his revolutionary work presents the idea that economics is a science based on a particular approach – the economic approach – which is applicable to all human behaviour. This short paper is a critique of the introductory chapter of his book “The Economic Approach to Human Behavior”, in which he has developed a coherent and strong methodology for neoclassical economics based on the extension of the neoclassical model of utility. Becker’s new methodology is a good example of a paradigm shift described by Kuhn (1962). The Kuhnian paradigm shift occurs when a new paradigm has the promise to answer more questions than a previous one. In this notion, Becker offers a new definition of economics linked with an approach rather than with a subject matter and summarizes the main characteristics of this unique approach. The economic approach assumes that 1) people maximize their behaviour, that 2) there is a market for every commodity1 and 3) that there is an equilibrium on every market. Moreover, human preferences are assumed to be stable (non-changing) mostly because it is difficult to understand how preferences are formed. These combined assumptions form the heart of the economic approach and create the economic model of homo economicus. They are enough to reduce all human behaviour to economic behaviour. Becker’s economic approach was “sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve” (Kuhn 1962, p.10). This paradigm shift, moreover, led to economic imperialism, where economics includes areas originally reserved for other social disciplines2. In the Kuhnian notion, therefore, Becker’s economic approach became mainstream in the economic theory as it has attracted an enduring group of adherents. However, economic schools that do not agree with Becker see his logical constructions insufficient or inconsistent. This is mostly because the homo economicus model does not often – contrary to Becker’s original belief – have the ability to explain real human action. The weakest points of Becker’s economic approach are the following assumptions: the stability of preferences, and maximising behaviour. These are discussed more deeply in what follows. Stability of preferences Becker believes that homo economicus has stable preferences. Science, however, should not be build up on believes but on falsifiable hypotheses. Therefore, we have to treat all Becker’s assumptions as hypotheses; otherwise, Becker’s system would only be a kind of religion (based on believes) rather that a coherent science (based on hypotheses). The assumption (i.e. hypothesis) of stable preferences has the big advantage of simplicity. With this assumption, Becker follows the perspective of his mentor, Milton Friedman, who (1953, p.14) argues that “a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumption; it takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained”. The hypothesis of stable preferences is dissociated from reality and difficult to test. But as Aranzadi notes (2006, p.148), “what Becker ignores is that once the hypothesis is dissociated from reality, any hypothesis is valid”. Moreover, without hypothesis-testing we can hardly build a coherent science. Becker’s scientific model, therefore, strongly contradicts with the definition of science by Karl Popper who argues that: “ the logical form [of a scientific system] shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to refuted by experience” (Popper, 1959, p.18). Becker’s scientific system is, however, not capable of falsifying. When Becker argues that he is able to explain all human behaviour, he does not create a scientific system in Popper’s sense as Becker’s system can never be falsified. Becker rather creates a religion: Either we believe in homo economicus or not. We cannot test it, we can not falsify it. In reality, obviously, people’s preferences change, which even Becker admits (Becker 1976, p.14), though he assumes for simplicity their stability. The change in preferences does not mean that people are irrational but rather that there exist motives, drivers (both endogenous such as personal norms and exogenous such as institutions, ethics) that lead the person to change his or her preferences. As people make choices according to their preferences, then if their preferences change, so do the choices. Becker acknowledges a slow evolution of preferences over time (Becker, 1976, p.14); but the evolution of preferences means – contrary to his conclusion – that in his simplified scheme we can explain human behaviour only in the short run then (i.e. before the change of preferences occurs). Becker’s approach offers only a static snapshot of human behaviour, which precludes us from analyzing it in the long run. If preferences change, if they are unstable, Becker’s approach has very circumscribed explanatory power. By neglecting to explain the formation of preferences, Becker is implicitly creating a divide between understanding and explaining human behaviour. It is mostly because the formations of preferences, motives, drivers that affect the behaviour, are crucial for the understanding of human behaviour. If we omit them, we explain behaviour without understanding it. Therefore, for Becker, there must be an implicit divide between understanding and explaining behaviour. Becker stresses the explanatory power of his approach. His economic approach aims to explain human behaviour but it does not aim to understand the behaviour. But even if we accept his notion that the ultimate target of social sciences is to explain human behaviour, we have to ask: Is it possible to explain a phenomenon without actually understanding it? If we answer no to this question (and it would be very difficult to answer yes), then we can hardly use the economic approach to explain all human behaviour. Becker has sacrificed the fullness of human behaviour by focusing only on explanation and not on the understanding of human behaviour. Forgetting to understand the formation of the human behaviour, he analyses only one side of the coin; explaining a phenomenon is not complete without understanding it. An economics which focuses only on explaining human behaviour does not give a full picture of that behaviour, and cannot be called a full-fledged science. It would only be an incomplete method (or a religion). It is not just the assumption of there being stable preferences per se but the formation of preferences matter in the economic theory in order to understand and therefore explain the human behaviour. The stability of preferences means that Becker’s approach is necessarily ahistorical. He does not consider it relevant to look at the historical development to try to understand the formation of preferences. He simply believes that this is out of the scope of economic science and that we should leave the formation of preferences to other social sciences (psychology, sociology). Becker, however, argues that the economic approach can explain all human behaviour but that other fields contribute to the understanding of human behaviour. He says that “the value of other social sciences is not diminished even by an enthusiastic and complete acceptance of the economic approach” (1952, p.14); but why would we need other social sciences if we are able to explain all human behaviour using the economic approach? Economics needs other social sciences to help economics to understand human behaviour as well to explain it but economics can not renege on the attempt to understand the formation of preferences. Even the acceptance of preference changes does not lead Becker to reconsider or relax his economic approach of stable preferences in his original paper (1976). In his later works, he – contrary to his original text – recognises the differences between stable and unstable environment and argues (Becker and Murphy, 2001, p.8): “This [economic] approach is adequate for dealing with many kinds of behavior when the social environment is stable. However, it cannot analyze behavior that aims to change this environment […]. Moreover, it says little about how exogenous changes in the social environment alter behavior, and nothing about how the aggregation of all behavior itself determines the social environment.” Becker therefore 30 years after the publishing of his original article admits that his model worksonly under the condition of stable environment. Much of [the] environment is, however, unstable. The transition from command economy to market economy, war, dramatic social changes, economic crisis, they are all examples of an unstable environment. For all this, the stability of preferences is a weak point of Becker’s economic approach. Maximizing behaviour Apart from stable preferences, Becker assumes that people maximize their utility. To put it simply, people – according to him – maximise a measure of the relative satisfaction from, or desirability of, consumption of various goods and services. He argues that people do not have to maximize utility consciously and that it is sufficient to consider that people behave only as if they maximize utility. With this notion, Becker tries to develop a universally valid theory of utility which is independent of particular facts. As elegant as it may appear, Becker’s assumption is, however, also weak and limited in use. This assumption of behaviour maximisation is an oversimplification. It can be challenged for example with the example of the first Czech president Vaclav Havel. Havel spent five years in prison for his democratic views during the communist regime. He preferred to stay in communist prison to regular offers (from the communists) to emigrate to the US. Havel’s behaviour is difficult to be explained using the economic approach and the behaviour maximisation theorem. It is difficult to imagine anybody maximising behaviour in by preferring to stay in a prison. There must have been some motive, norm, or some sort of ethics that stood behind Havel’s behaviour. What Havel was doing was not behaviour maximisation (either consciously or as if) but rather doing something because he was persuaded it is the right thing to do. His behaviour was based on morals, sense of justice perhaps, but it was not a utility maximising behaviour. This type of behaviour (and the world is plentiful of this type of behaviour) cannot be considered irrational because these decision-makers are rational, meaning they are aware of possible outcomes and take them into account. This behaviour cannot be explained using the economic approach. We see that the generalisation of homo economicus as the basis for explaining every action eliminates the object of study – the human being (Aranzadi, 2006, p.138). The economic approach leaves no room for [the] subjective aspect of human action; it is ahistorical, meaning that the historical development of the society or personal development of the decision-maker is irrelevant. The flow of time, habits, norms, or experiences cannot be included in the analysis. Becker, therefore, creates a technically coherent method for mathematical economics at the same moment as he misses the point that economics is primarily a social science. His theory is static and it does not allow for dynamic changes. He formed the basis for today’s standard neoclassical models and made economics a part of technical sciences. Aranzadi (2006, p.152) argues that Becker’s notion of maximising behaviour copies physics. Economics is, however, a social science and it should do its best to explain but also to understand human behaviour. Following Thaler (2000), we argue that the reason why Becker did not include norms, ethics, and institutions in his coherent yet simplistic model is because these behavioural models are harder than traditional ones. Building models of rational, unemotional agents is easier than building models of quasi-rational emotional humans. Because of the oversimplification of maximising utility, Becker’s model therefore made economics a part of technical sciences. Conclusion Becker states that the economic approach provides a valuable and unified framework for understanding all human behaviour. However, his stylised model of homo economicus has the ability to explain the human behaviour under very restrictive conditions only (short run, no institutional changes, no changes in norms, or ethics). The economic approach therefore, can be renounced in explaining all human behaviour. Becker’s economic approach avoids the attempt to explain what actually drives human behaviour. But any social science must have the ambition to explain the motives of human behaviour if we want to understand the behaviour. Becker has created a world based on simplistic and unrealistic assumptions and within this world all that he proves is a set of tautologies. But even Becker’s mentor Milton Friedman (1953, p.11) stresses that “economic theory must be more than just a set of tautologies if it is able to predict and not merely describe the consequences of action; if it is something different from disguised mathematics.” Becker’s perception of the object of economics – homo economicus – is by assumption different from the real human person. It is not, however, the method of abstraction used in social sciences, but rather a creating of a very specific world, where Becker’s assumptions hold but in a world which is far from observed reality. If economics is to understand and explain why people make choices, it needs to understand the formation of preferences as well. When assuming stable preferences, Becker does not ask why people make the choices they make. Economic, social or cultural development can also offer answers for the explanation of human behaviour. Becker, however, does not and can not integrate institutions, norms, or ethics in his model. On the other hand, over time even Becker relaxed his belief that the economic approach can explain all economic behaviour3. The universality of his approach is therefore doubtful. In conclusion, the economic approach certainly has the ability to explain more than other paradigms, but only if we accept Becker’s assumptions of homo economicus, which are – contrary to their elegance – weaker and to a big extent limited in use as described in this critique. The fact is, however, that substantial portions of economic theory would not survive if economic agents could not be assumed to have stable preferences and to maximise their behaviour. References Aranzadi J. (2009): ’Liberalism against Liberalism Theoretical Analysis of the Works of Ludwig von Mises and Gary Becker’. Published by: Routledge Becker, G. (1976): ‘The Economic Approach to Human Behavior’. The University of Chicago Press Becker, G. and K.M. Murphy, (2001): ‘Social Economics:‘Market Behavior in a Social Environment’. Harvard University Press Friedman, M. (1953): ‘The methodology of positive economics’. University of Chicago Press Kuhn, T. S. (1962): ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’. 1st. ed., Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1962 Popper, K. (1959): ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’. Hutchinson. Thaler, R.H. (2000): ‘From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 14, Number 1, Winter 2000

readings

• Selhání ekonomie? Štěpán Jurajda, poznámky v rámci panelu ČSE 4.12.2009

http://home.cerge-ei.cz/jurajda/panelCSE2009.pdf

Ekonomie na tom nikdy nebyla lépe, i přes současnou kritiku spojenou s finanční krizí. Za prvé,
většina našeho vědního oboru nemá nic společného s makroekonomií a dovoluje vyvracet hypotézy na základě metod
, které se i díky pokroku v posledních desetiletích blíží zlatému standardu vědy
(v rámci možností sociálních věd). Za druhé byla i teoretická a makro‐ekonomie (již před lety)
slušně připravena vysvětlit jevy, ke kterým došlo, a nabízí dobrá vodítka pro nastavení efektivních opatření (regulací), které donedávna chyběly
, a které do budoucna podobné anomálie významně omezí.

• The Unification of the Behavioral Sciences

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/events/papers/090402_t.pdf

• Paul A. Samuelson, Groundbreaking Economist, Dies at 94
  

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/business/economy/14samuelson.html

• Gregor

http://clickbeetle.blogspot.com/2009/12/obsluhoval-jsem-pokeroveho-krale.html

• Wake up, gentlemen’, world’s top bankers warned by former Fed chairman Volcker

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article6949387.ece
As bankers demanded that new regulation should not stifle innovation, a clearly irritated Mr Volcker said that the biggest innovation in the industry over the past 20 years had been the cash machine. He went on to attack the rise of complex products such as credit default swaps (CDS).
“I wish someone would give me one shred of neutral evidence that financial innovation has led to economic growth — one shred of evidence,” said Mr Volcker, who ran the Fed from 1979 to 1987 and is now chairman of President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/30/the_fp_top_100_global_thinkers

• Tax Cuts Might Accomplish What Spending Hasn’t Mankiw
  

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/business/economy/13view.html?_r=1

The report in January put numbers to this conclusion. It says that an extra dollar of government spending raises G.D.P. by $1.57, while a dollar of tax cuts raises G.D.P. by only 99 cents. The implication is that if we are going to increase the budget deficit to promote growth and jobs, it is better to spend more than tax less.

But various recent studies suggest that conventional wisdom is backward.

One piece of evidence comes from Christina D. Romer, the chairwoman of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers. In work with her husband, David H. Romer, written at the University of California, Berkeley, just months before she took her current job, Ms. Romer found that tax policy has a powerful influence on economic activity.

According to the Romers, each dollar of tax cuts has historically raised G.D.P. by about $3

My Harvard colleagues Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna have recently conducted a comprehensive analysis of the issue. In an October study, they looked at large changes in fiscal policy in 21 nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. They identified 91 episodes since 1970 in which policy moved to stimulate the economy. They then compared the policy interventions that succeeded — that is, those that were actually followed by robust growth — with those that failed.

The results are striking. Successful stimulus relies almost entirely on cuts in business and income taxes. Failed stimulus relies mostly on increases in government spending.

both increases in taxes and increases in government spending have a strong negative effect on private investment spending. This effect is difficult to reconcile with Keynesian theory.

Readings

• -Utok na RFE

former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein planned a terrorist attack on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty at a time when the radio broadcaster had its headquarters downtown Prague. Czech counter-intelligence service BIS followed Iraqi DGI intelligence service agents as early as in 1999, reports the news website tn.cz. Saddam Hussein is believed to have ordered the attack to silence radio broadcasting to Iraq by the Radio Free Europe, which is funded by the US government. According to BIS spokesperson Jan Šubert, Hussein's secret agents had planned a machine gun and rocket propelled grenade attack on the RFE building.
http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=654700

• -Jakl on Minarety:

http://neviditelnypes.lidovky.cz/spolecnost-minarety-a-cigarety-d3j-/p_spolecnost.asp?c=A091203_204007_p_spolecnost_wag

• -Zajimava Kniha:

http://www.kosmas.cz/knihy/107369/v-pasti-uspechu/

V pasti úspěchu - anotace
Ve své knize si autor všímá mohutných trendů rodící se epochy, změn v organizaci a hodnocení práce a jejich vlivu na rodinu, přátelství, společenství a osobní život.
Logika knihy je přímočará. Svět se proměňuje závratnou rychlostí. Vstupujeme do doby stejně převratné, ne-li převratnější, než byla průmyslová revoluce. Nové ekonomické vztahy nabízejí bezprecedentní příležitosti, rozšiřují výběr úžasných obchodů, výrobků, dobrých investic a skvělých míst pro lidi se správným talentem a zkušeností. Nikdy předtím nemělo tak velké množství lidí tak snadný přístup k tolika možnostem. Někteří z nás začínají být mimořádně bohatí, většina je na tom lépe v tom, co si může koupit. Konkurence je však ostřejší, pracovní místa jsou méně jistá, naše příjmy hůře předvídatelné, prohlubuje se nerovnost ve výdělcích a bohatství a společnost se začíná rozdělovat. Kdo si chce udržet dobré postavení, musí více hodin a intenzivněji pracovat, takže mu nezbývá čas ani energie na ostatní stránky života. Není to ďábelská intrika ani past poťouchle nastražená zlými korporacemi a nenasytnými kapitalisty. Jsme to my sami, kdo v roli spotřebitelů a zákazníků toto kolo roztáčíme do vysokých obrátek. Jsme to my, kdo stojíme před volbou podobné té, před níž stáli naši předci před zhruba sto lety: jak užívat bohatství, které nám nová ekonomika nabízí, a uchovat si přitom svou vlastní identitu, lidskou tvář a důstojnost. Které hodnoty zvolíme a jaký život si přejeme pro sebe, pro své děti a pro společnost?

• Monitorin g centrá lních bank – prosin ec

http://www.cnb.cz/m2export/sites/www.cnb.cz/cs/menova_politika/monitoring_centralnich_bank/download/0904_mcb.pdf

Většina námi sledovaných centrálních bank ponechává své klíčové sazby na nízké úrovni a současně
pokračuje v provádění nekonvenční měnové politiky. Ekonomická aktivita zůstává slabá, nicméně
objevují se již známky oživení a přepokládá se pozvolné zotavování koncem roku 2009 a v roce
2010. Rovněž dochází k zastavování dalšího poklesu inflace.

• A Cure for Crises: Confidence, Confidence and Trust

http://www.riksbank.com/upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Tal/2009/090929_eng.pdf

Governor Stefan Ingves
On a fundamental level, all crises share causes and cures but they also have many differences. The cure is made up of two ingredients: 1) regain confidence to resolve a crisis; and 2) preserve confidence to prevent a crisis from repeating itself. Given the international dimension of this crisis and the proliferation of cross-border banking, the cure for this crisis also involves a third component – trust between authorities to enhance cross-border crisis management.

A loss of confidence is the driver of a liquidity crunch, but the lemon problem, as first noted by George Akerlof in 1970, explains the mechanics of a market breakdown. A lemon is an asset of bad quality, originally referring to poor quality cars. In short, the lemon problem arises when sellers know whether or not their asset is a lemon, but potential buyers cannot tell the difference. The risk of purchasing a lemon will lower the price buyers are willing to pay for any asset and, because market prices are depressed, owners of non-lemon assets will be unwilling to put them up for sale.

Building confidence in the long-run: liquidity and capital regulation

The conclusion is that liquidity must be regulated more firmly. Banks need to hold a buffer of liquid assets large enough to allow them to weather a liquidity shock.

liquidity regulation will make maturity transformation more costly. We clearly need more regulation today but, in casting additional regulation, we have to consider the costs. Too strict regulation would stifle competition, make financial services more expensive and, in the long run, hamper economic growth. On the other hand, too loose regulation would inspire speculation with taxpayers’ money and also reduce economic growth. Thus, the extent of financial regulation is – at least partly – a question of society’s risk tolerance.

• Vánoční dárky jsou ekonomický nesmysl, napsal ekonom

http://byznys.lidovky.cz/vanocni-darky-jsou-ekonomicky-nesmysl-napsal-ekonom-pco-/moje-penize.asp?c=A091207_180130_moje-penize_tai
Vánoce jsou obrovským plýtváním peněz. Lidé, kteří dávají dary, je oproti reálné hodnotě, jež mají pro příjemce, příliš nadhodnocují. Tak argumentuje ve své knize ekonom Joel Waldfogel. "Způsob, jak v západním světě slavíme Vánoce, je orgie ničení ekonomické hodnoty, které vymaže každoročně pětadvacet miliard dolarů," řekl Waldfogel během své přednášky v Londýně.

Věci, které dostanou lidé darem, pro ně mají totiž o průměrně dvacet procent menší hodnotu, než ty, které by si koupili sami. Ztráta vzniká z nevhodných dárků a chybného výběru, prostě toho, že se darující "netrefí" do vkusu a zájmů obdarovaného, Waldfogel, který učí ekonomii na Pensylvánské univerzitě, se sledování ztrát vznikajících darováním věnuje už několik let. V roce 1993 napsal článek do American Economic Review pod názvem Jalové ztráty Vánoc, ve kterém argumentuje, že přibližně deset až třicet procent hodnoty daru je aktem darování nenávratně ztraceno.

Jedním z dobrých způsobů, jak zabránit plýtvání při darování, je darovat peníze - pak by si příjemce mohl samozřejmě koupit to, co skutečně potřebuje a chce. To ale podle Waldfogela není vždy možné, protože společenské normy obvykle nepřipouštějí, aby se obdarovávalo penězi. Lidé také nemohou zcela svátky ignorovat, protože dávání dárků je už zavedená společenská praxe.

• IMF PAPER, What is the damage, output development after financial crisis.

http://www.cerge.cuni.cz/pdf/events/papers/091014_t.pdf

strany 5,6,10,13

• How to Create Jobs

Nobelist Paul Krugman vs Nobelist Gary Becker.

• New Research on Fiscal Policy

From Harvard's Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna:

Large changes in fiscal policy: taxes versus spending

We examine the evidence on episodes of large stances in fiscal policy, both in cases of fiscal stimuli and in that of fiscal adjustments in OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. Fiscal stimuli based upon tax cuts are more likely to increase growth than those based upon spending increases. As for fiscal adjustments, those based upon spending cuts and no tax increases are more likely to reduce deficits and debt over GDP ratios than those based upon tax increases. In addition, adjustments on the spending side rather than on the tax side are less likely to create recessions.

--
Martin Pospisil